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SUBSTANTIAL RISK OF FUTURE INJURY
AS A BASIS FOR STANDING IN DATA
BREACH CASES
Jennifer Wilt*
IN In re SuperValu, Inc. (subsequently referred to as Alleruzzo), theEighth Circuit deepened the circuit split on the issue of whether thesubstantial risk of future identity theft is sufficient to establish the
injury-in-fact prong of standing.1 In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, the
Supreme Court addressed substantial risk of injury as a basis for stand-
ing.2 The Court held that the future injury alleged in the complaint was
insufficient for standing because it “relie[d] on a highly attenuated chain
of possibilities.”3 Several circuits, coming to varying conclusions, have ap-
plied Clapper in data breach cases to determine whether the increased
risk of future identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact re-
quirement.4 In Alleruzzo, the court applied Clapper to hold that fifteen of
the named plaintiffs had not alleged a substantial risk of future identity
theft sufficient for standing.5 The Eighth Circuit was correct in its holding
because limiting the application of substantial risk as a basis for standing
simplifies the analysis and prevents generalized claims from making it
into the courts. Particularly in the context of data breaches, limitations
must be placed on the standing doctrine to prevent wasting judicial
resources.
In the summer of 2014, retail grocery stores operated by SuperValu
suffered two cyberattacks on their computer network that processed cus-
tomers’ payments.6 As a result of the breaches, hackers gained access to
customers’ names, credit or debit card numbers, card expiration dates,
card verification value codes, and personal identification numbers.7 The
plaintiffs were customers who shopped at SuperValu stores using a credit
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1. See 870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2017).
2. See 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
3. Id. at 410.
4. Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 769.
5. Id. at 771.
6. Id. at 765–66.
7. Id. at 766.
615
616 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
or debit card.8 Fifteen of the sixteen named plaintiffs alleged substantial
risk of future identity theft, claiming that they had spent time determin-
ing if their cards were compromised and monitoring account informa-
tion.9 Only one plaintiff alleged a fraudulent charge following the
breach.10
The customers affected by the data breaches alleged that SuperValu
had failed to adequately protect customers’ card information and failed
to conform to best practices and industry standards for merchants ac-
cepting payment by credit or debit card.11 As a result, the plaintiffs were
exposed to the “imminent and real possibility of identity theft.”12 The
district court granted SuperValu’s motion to dismiss based on the plain-
tiffs’ failure to allege an injury in fact sufficient for standing.13 In deter-
mining standing, the district court considered the sixteen named
plaintiffs’ claims collectively and concluded that a single fraudulent
charge alleged by only one plaintiff was insufficient.14 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed this decision based on their theory of substantial risk of future
identity theft.15
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the fifteen
named plaintiffs who alleged only the substantial risk of future identity
theft and reversed the dismissal of the named plaintiff who alleged a
fraudulent charge on his account.16 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of the claims alleging substantial risk of future injury for two pri-
mary reasons. First, the allegations that plaintiffs’ information had been
misused were too speculative.17 In supporting their theory of injury, the
plaintiffs alleged that illegal websites were selling their information and
that their financial institutions were attempting to mitigate the risk, which
the court rejected as a basis for standing.18 Second, the court determined
that the theft of plaintiffs’ credit or debit card information did not create
a substantial risk of future injury, and the costs of mitigating any sup-
posed risk were insufficient to create an injury in fact.19
In analyzing the issue of substantial risk, the court emphasized the ab-
sence of risk where the stolen information merely consists of credit card
information.20 Since this information alone cannot be used to open new
accounts, there is little risk that anyone will use the stolen information to
commit any fraud.21 Despite the relatively low bar for standing at the
8. Id. at 767.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 766.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 767.
14. Id. at 768.
15. Id. at 768–69.
16. Id. at 774.
17. Id. at 770.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 770–71.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 770.
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pleading stage, the court reasoned that “[i]t is possible that some years
later there may be more detailed factual support for plaintiffs’ allega-
tions,” but that support is absent here and “mere possibility” is insuffi-
cient.22 The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations of mitigating the
risk of identity theft as sufficient to create injury in fact because the plain-
tiffs failed to allege a substantial risk in the first place.23 Therefore, the
plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by spending time and money pro-
tecting against a speculative threat.24
In addressing the circuit split, the court noted that other circuits have
applied Clapper to find standing where an increased risk of future iden-
tity theft is alleged.25 The court declined to address the varying outcomes
based on its conclusion that “the cases ultimately turned on the substance
of the allegations.”26 The court referred to Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Group27 in its analysis for the proposition that a complaint can plausibly
allege that the theft of financial information creates substantial risk, but it
distinguished—without much explanation—the plaintiffs’ claims.28 In
Remijas, the court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations of lost time and
money as a result of their credit card information being stolen in a data
breach were sufficient to demonstrate a substantial risk of harm.29 The
court reasoned that the risk was substantial since customers’ information
had already been stolen and 9,200 customers had already incurred fraud-
ulent charges.30 The Remijas court noted that requiring plaintiffs to wait
until hackers actually commit fraud could create more standing problems
down the road because it becomes harder to trace the injury to the initial
breach.31 Though the Eighth Circuit did not discuss the Remijas case be-
yond a passing mention, the reasoning in Alleruzzo suggests a fundamen-
tal disagreement in assessing the risk of stolen credit card information
since the court outright rejected the notion that breach alone was suffi-
cient for standing.32
The court also cited Beck v. McDonald33 to support the idea that stolen
credit card information does not pose a threat significant enough to con-
stitute a substantial risk.34 In Beck, the Fourth Circuit rejected a substan-
tial risk of future injury claim as too speculative.35 Veterans receiving
medical treatment filed suit when a laptop with unencrypted patient in-
22. Id. at 771.
23. Id. at 771–72.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 769.
26. Id.
27. See generally 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
28. Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 770.
29. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692, 696.
30. Id. at 692.
31. Id. at 693.
32. Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 770–71.
33. See generally 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017).
34. Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 771.
35. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.
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formation was stolen from the facility.36 The stolen information included
the patients’ names, birth dates, last four digits of social security numbers,
and physical descriptors.37 In finding that the “mere theft of these items,
without more, [could not] confer Article III standing,”38 the court relied
on the fact that no evidence of misuse or identity theft had been discov-
ered at that point in the case, despite extensive discovery.39 The Al-
leruzzo court seems to have used similar reasoning—since there was little
to no risk that identity theft would occur, the risk was minimal and so
standing on the basis of substantial risk could not be found.40
The Eighth Circuit came to the correct conclusion in finding that the
plaintiffs named in Alleruzzo failed to allege a substantial risk of future
injury sufficient to establish an injury in fact.41 The allegations are too
speculative—the risk that one might experience credit card fraud is insuf-
ficient. An even more problematic aspect of the substantial risk of future
harm allegations is that the potential for credit card fraud hardly seems
substantial in a day and age where credit card numbers are stolen all the
time and companies actively monitor for this activity.42 The risk seems
especially minimal in light of the fact that cancelling credit cards is a rela-
tively easy process and banks often reimburse customers for fraudulent
charges.43 Thus, the only expense is mere inconvenience or fear.44 Al-
lowing these claims to provide standing runs the risk of allowing genera-
lized claims into court. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme
Court rejected similar types of claims that would have allowed virtually
anyone with an interest in the subject matter of the suit who alleged that
their interest would be negatively impacted to establish injury in fact.45
The Alleruzzo plaintiffs’ theory of injury is similar to the claim rejected in
Lujan—they want anyone connected to the data breach to have standing,
regardless of whether injury is likely or imminent—but it is entirely too
speculative to suggest that anyone who charges their credit card in a store
that experiences a breach has suffered an injury in fact.46 Though immi-
36. Id. at 267.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 275.
39. Id. at 274.
40. In re SuperValu, Inc. (Alleruzzo), 870 F.3d 763, 770–71 (8th Cir. 2017).
41. Id.
42. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 368 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (explaining that
“[h]ackers are constantly seeking to gain access to the data banks of companies . . .” and
that hacked companies often provide free services to monitor hacked customers’ accounts).
43. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION:
DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIM-
ITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 30 (2007) (explaining that existing laws
limit consumer liability in the event of fraud and that many companies “voluntarily cover
all fraudulent charges”).
44. But see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (reasoning
that generalized anxiety and stress resulting from data breach is sufficient to create an
injury in fact).
45. See 504 U.S. 555, 563, 566 (1992) (involving a challenge to a statute that interfered
with plaintiffs’ ability to observe the habitats of various endangered species).
46. In re SuperValu, Inc. (Alleruzzo), 870 F.3d 763, 769–70 (8th Cir. 2017).
2018] Cancelled Credit Cards 619
nence is an “elastic concept,” it would be stretched too far if individuals
who have suffered inconvenience, at most, were allowed to move
forward.47
At the pleading stage, the threshold for establishing standing should be
low so that individuals are permitted to bring claims when they have suf-
fered harms.48 Striking the appropriate balance between allowing those
who have been exposed in a data breach to bring claims and dismissing
generalized claims is particularly precarious when the plaintiffs have al-
leged substantial risk of future injury. On the one hand, requiring more
specific details of how the plaintiffs will suffer harm in the future helps to
keep trivial claims out of the courts. On the other hand, requiring more
factual allegations at the pleading stage to allege a minimum injury only
creates—as the Lujan dissent describes it—an “empty formality.”49 The
Eighth Circuit skirted around the issue by stating that it may be “possible
that some years later there may be more detailed factual support for
plaintiffs’ allegations of future injury,” but the current support is lack-
ing.50 The court should not have kept the door open to future injury
claims in breaches involving only credit card information. The entire anal-
ysis rejects the plaintiffs’ theory of standing because there is minimal risk,
but then the court chose to avoid creating precedent that rejects standing
in future injury cases entirely.51 But the court’s analysis was sound—only
cases that have alleged substantial risk should go forward, and cases in-
volving the theft of credit card information simply do not involve substan-
tial risk. Further, the suggestion is misleading because it becomes more
likely that plaintiffs will have difficulty establishing the traceability ele-
ment of standing as more time passes.52
The court implied that substantial risk of future injury would be suffi-
cient for standing in cases involving personal information.53 Though the
court does not rely on this premise to reject the plaintiffs’ claims, the
distinction between personal information and credit card information is
an important one.54 As the court noted, when credit card information is
stolen, there is little risk of identity theft because unauthorized accounts
cannot be opened with credit card numbers alone.55 And so, when credit
card information alone is stolen, the only risk is fraudulent charges, which
47. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
48. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (explaining that plaintiffs may allege general factual
allegations at the pleading stage but must provide “specific facts” at the summary judgment
stage).
49. Id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 771.
51. See id. at 770–72.
52. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (explaining the elements of standing); see also Clap-
per, 568 U.S. at 413 (reasoning that plaintiffs would not be able to establish causal connec-
tion because they could only speculate as to whether the injury would occur).
53. See Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 770–71.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 770.
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can often be easily remedied without court intervention.56 However,
where personal information is involved—social security numbers, birth
dates, or driver’s license numbers—the risk of identity theft is substantial
since criminals can use the information to open unauthorized accounts.57
Further, the risks would be more difficult to prevent and remedy.58 Not
to mention, the risk remains potentially forever.59
In comparing the types of data stolen, the court’s reliance on Beck
seems misguided. Despite the fact that the stolen information was per-
sonal, the Beck court determined that there was not a substantial risk of
future injury because there was no evidence of misuse following extensive
discovery.60 But this seems too harsh for an injury-in-fact analysis, espe-
cially at the pleading stage.61 For starters, the passage of time would not
provide much comfort to individuals who have had such sensitive infor-
mation stolen. Additionally, the Beck court’s concern with the passage of
time seems more appropriate in determining the causal connection com-
ponent of standing.62 As time passes, the connection between the breach
and the fraudulently used information may be more difficult to establish,
but this analysis is inappropriate in assessing the injury-in-fact element.
Other circuits have relied on the distinction between stolen credit card
information and stolen personal information in assessing substantial risk
of future injury. The Second Circuit rejected claims of substantial risk of
future injury where the data breach only involved credit card informa-
tion.63 Notably, the plaintiff had experienced a fraudulent charge, but her
bank repaid it and the plaintiff had cancelled her card so there was no
risk of future fraud.64 This approach is sound—a plaintiff should not be
allowed to proceed where the court will not need to address any sort of
present injury. The Sixth Circuit held that allegations of substantial risk
of future harm were sufficient for standing where the information stolen
from an insurance company included existing and potential customers’
birth dates, social security numbers, and driver’s license numbers.65 The
56. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 43, at 30 (explaining that
existing laws limit consumer liability for fraudulent charges and that credit and debit card
companies often voluntarily cover fraudulent charges).
57. See Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 770; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 43, at 9 (explaining how personally identifying information can be used to open
new accounts or incur charges on existing accounts and, further, that identity theft victims
may be unaware of identity theft for longer periods of time, thus causing them to “face
substantial costs and inconvenience repairing damage to their credit records”).
58. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 43, at 28–29 (explaining the
difficulty in determining the link between breach and identity theft because it is difficult to
determine how the data was obtained and identity thieves may wait to commit fraud).
59. See id. at 29.
60. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017).
61. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 768.
62. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 412–13 (2013) (reasoning that
plaintiffs could not establish causal connection where they could only speculate that injury
would occur).
63. Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017).
64. Id.
65. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 663 F. App’x 384, 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2016).
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court inferred substantial risk from the mere fact that personal informa-
tion was stolen, reasoning that it would be unreasonable to require plain-
tiffs to wait for actual misuse.66
In the narrow context of determining if a substantial risk of future in-
jury exists in data breach cases, courts should distinguish the types of in-
formation stolen. Where the breach has resulted in stolen credit card
information, the claims should be dismissed because there is no substan-
tial risk and, therefore, no injury in fact. But where the breach has re-
sulted in stolen personal information, the claims should be presumed to
establish substantial risk sufficient for injury in fact. In other words, the
mere fact of the breach establishes injury in fact where personally identi-
fying information is involved.67 Arguably, such a presumption would cre-
ate generalized standing, but this risk seems minimal considering such
claims would be rejected where the other elements of standing could not
be established.
The holding in Alleruzzo deepens the circuit split regarding whether
substantial risk of future injury is sufficient to confer standing in data
breach cases. While some courts have been too lenient in allowing claims
to go forward, others have been too strict in dismissing meritorious
claims. A more straightforward approach is necessary to help courts grap-
ple with the increasing number of data breach cases. In light of the recent
breach of Equifax, courts will need more streamlined methods to assess
standing.68 Presumably, many suits will be filed in the coming months and
so the urgency of clarifying the injury-in-fact analysis in data breach cases
is even more pressing.69
66. Id. at 388.
67. See Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that sub-
stantial harm exists where personally identifying information is stolen “by virtue of the
hack”).
68. See Credit Reporting Agency Equifax Suffers Hack Affecting 146 Million, TICKER
(Sept. 25, 2017), http://theticker.org/credit-reporting-agency-equifax-suffers-hack-affecting-
146-million [https://perma.cc/S3BZ-FRAN] (describing the breach affecting the personal
information of over 143 million Americans at Equifax, one of three major consumer credit
reporting agencies).
69. See Scott Cole & Associates, Scott Cole & Associates Files Class Action Lawsuit
Against Equifax for Data Breach, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/scott-cole—associates-files-class-action-lawsuit-against-equifax-
for-data-breach-300520112.html [https://perma.cc/G939-P7VT].
